Analytical security of cryptographic protocols does not immedi- ately translate to operational security: incorrect implementation and runtime attacks can undermine even a formally sound design. The RV-TEE framework has been applied to address this gap across a growing range of protocols, from classical session-oriented proto- cols such as SSH and TLS, to post-quantum constructions includ- ing group authenticated key exchange based on CRYSTALS-Kyber. With the standardisation of CRYSTALS-Dilithium as ML-DSA un- der FIPS 204, attention now turns to the trustworthy deployment of post-quantum digital signatures — a class of cryptographic prim- itive not yet addressed within the RV-TEE line of work. Unlike the session-oriented and key exchange protocols studied previously, Dilithium is a stateless signature scheme: its operations — key gen- eration, signing, and verification — are atomic and self-contained, calling for a different characterisation of what constitutes correct and secure execution. Relevant runtime properties shift away from protocol sequencing and towards computational integrity, parame- ter validity, and the faithful execution of lattice-based arithmetic.